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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises out of an action under the Sherman 
Act alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize 
the thriving United States market for oriental rugs. 1 It 
requires us to determine, among other things, whether the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA" or "the 
Act"), 15 U.S.C. S 6, divested the District Court of subject 
matter jurisdiction over this action. The plaintiffs are 
Carpet Group International ("CGI"), a Virginia corporation, 
and Emmert Elsea, a citizen of Virginia who is CGI's 
founder and sole shareholder. Elsea founded CGI with the 
objective of making imported oriental rugs available to 
retailers directly from manufacturers, bypassing importers 
at the wholesale level and thereby reducing rug prices to 
United States consumers. The defendants charged 
with antitrust violations are an association of 
importer/wholesalers of oriental rugs called the Oriental 
Rug Importers Association, Inc. ("ORIA"), several companies 
who are members of ORIA, and three individuals who are 
past or present officers and directors of ORIA. 
 
In the District Court and on appeal, the defendants 
object to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction primarily 
on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the 
FTAIA. They assert that the plaintiffs failed to establish 
jurisdiction under the Act because they have not proven 
that the defendants' actions did not involve or otherwise 
substantially affect United States commerce.2 The United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Figures recently released by the Oriental Rug Importers Association of 
the summary of United States Department of Commerce import figures 
for 1998 disclose that the United States imported a total of 106,929,000 
square feet of rugs -- a sharp increase from the 1997 total of 87,300,000 
square feet. The increase in dollar value of imports was similarly 
dramatic -- climbing to $422,549,000 in 1998 from $335,505,000 in 
1997. See <http://www.oria.org/winter2000_4.htm>. 
2. The plaintiffs contend that the District Court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over its antitrust claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1337 and 
over its state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1367. This Court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
                                3 
 
 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, acting 
on the report and recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, 
granted the motion of the defendants for dismissal of the 




Firms involved in the oriental rug trade in the United 
States have traditionally utilized a narrow chain of 
distribution. In this carefully constricted chain, foreign rug 
manufacturers sell their goods to wholesalers in the United 
States, who import the rugs and then sell them to U.S. 
retailers. The retailers in turn resell the rugs to consumers. 
In the early 1990s, plaintiff Emmert Elsea conceived a plan 
by which retailers and consumers in this country could 
purchase oriental rugs more cheaply. He theorized that if 
U.S. retailers were to purchase rugs directly from foreign 
manufacturers, bypassing the wholesaler link in the chain 
of distribution, they could reduce the costs to themselves 
and, consequently, to consumers. Elsea founded CGI in 
order to facilitate his vision of a new chain of rug 
distribution. 
 
In 1993 and 1994, CGI sponsored two trade shows in the 
United States at which foreign rug manufacturers were 
invited to display rugs and sell directly to American 
retailers. CGI expected to earn fees paid by the 
manufacturers for space at the trade show. In addition, 
Elsea, and later CGI, took U.S. retailers on buying trips to 
rug-producing countries in exchange for fees. On these 
trips, the plaintiffs arranged for the retailers to purchase 
rugs directly from foreign rug manufacturers. CGI's trade 
shows and buying trips were the mechanisms through 
which the plaintiffs attempted to effectuate their plan to 
assist American retailers in purchasing oriental rugs 
directly from the foreign manufacturer. 
 
The plaintiffs claim that the defendants conspired to 
sabotage their efforts to facilitate direct sales between 
foreign manufacturers and United States retailers and, 
more specifically, conspired to wreck plaintiffs' trade shows. 
Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that the defendants 
used the following tactics: 
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       (a) threatening not to purchase rugs from any 
       manufacturer who participated in the trade shows; 
 
       (b) threatening not to purchase rugs from any 
       manufacturer who sells rugs to any retailer on a 
       buying trip; 
 
       (c) threatening and retaliating, including expulsion 
       from the association, against any ORIA member 
       that participated in the plaintiffs' trade shows; 
 
       (d) inducing the Carpet Export Promotion Council of 
       India, the Export Promotion Board of Pakistan, 
       and the Pakistan Carpet Manufacturers and 
       Exporters Association not to subsidize the 
       participation of manufacturers from those 
       countries in the plaintiffs' trade shows; 
 
       (e) threatening not to sell rugs to retailers who 
       participate in the buying trips sponsored by 
       plaintiffs. 
 
The defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants argued that the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA"), 15 
U.S.C. S 6a, deprived the District Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction under the antitrust laws by excluding the 
plaintiffs' claims from the coverage of those laws. The FTAIA 
provides, in relevant part, 
 
       Sections 1 to 7 of this title[, which include the 
       Sherman Act,] shall not apply to conduct involving 
       trade or commerce (other than import trade or import 
       commerce) with foreign nations unless-- 
 
        (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and 
       reasonably foreseeable effect-- 
 
         (A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or 
       commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or 
       import commerce with foreign nations . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. S 6a.3 The District Court referred the motion to a 
Magistrate Judge. In accordance with circuit precedent, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The FTAIA was enacted as Title IV of the Export Trading Company Act 
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 1233, 1246. 
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plaintiffs introduced evidence to support their contention 
that the FTAIA did not apply to their claims and therefore 
did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction. 
 
A. The Jurisdictional Evidence. 
 
The plaintiffs offered documentary evidence before the 
Magistrate Judge dealing with activity by ORIA and its 
members to convince foreign governments, foreign rug trade 
associations, and one domestic rug retailers' association 
not to provide financial assistance to the CGI trade shows. 
For example, ORIA wrote to the secretary of the Carpet 
Export Promotion Council of India ("CEPC") that in deciding 
whether or not to co-sponsor CGI's November 1993 Chicago 
trade show, the CEPC should consider that doing so would 
"possibly jeopardize a very friendly and prosperous 
relationship" between Indian rug manufacturers and 
American importers. (JA.92). In addition, defendant Hodges 
(the president of defendant Pande Cameron & Co. of New 
York, an importer/wholesaler) wrote to the chairman of the 
CEPC, expressing his opinion that the CGI 1993 show was 
"destined for failure," asking for the chairman's "comments 
and observations in lending CEPC support to this show," 
and requesting "the names of those exporters from India 
who plan on exhibiting." With respect to this last request, 
Hodges wrote: "These would be exporters, I can assure you 
we would avoid in any future business discussions." 
(JA.93). There is no evidence in this record that CEPC 
furnished Hodges with these names. 
 
CGI planned another trade show in Washington, DC in 
August 1994. In March of that year, defendant Newman 
(the president of defendant Noonoo Rug Co.) wrote to the 
vice-chairman of the Export Promotion Bureau of Pakistan 
("EPB") and the Pakistan Carpet Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association ("PCMEA") regarding this trade show, 
urging the PCMEA and the EPB "not to encourage nor 
support the `renegade' activities and selfish motives of a few 
Pakistani trader/exporters and their American retail 
counterparts." Newman also noted that "[t]o do so would be 
to continue on the road leading to ill will and chaos." 
(JA.94-95). The PCMEA subsequently made efforts toward 
conciliation with ORIA. Its vice chairman wrote to ORIA 
 
                                6 
 
 
informing it of PCMEA's decision not to officially participate 
in the Washington Fair being held in August that year, and 
of its request that the EPB not "give any facility to" the 
participants. He reiterated that "no manner of 
encouragement or patronage" would be provided by the 
Association to any firm desiring to participate in the fair. 
(JA.96). 
 
On March 23, 1994, Hodges, acting in his capacity as 
ORIA president, wrote to the president of the Oriental Rug 
Retailers Association ("ORRA"), a United States trade 
association, regarding the August 1994 CGI trade show. He 
stated: 
 
       Rumor has it that the ORRA has been approached by 
       CGI to cosponsor this function. I think you are well 
       aware of our sentiments regarding the purpose of this 
       trade fair in undermining existing channels of 
       distribution which have proven to be successful to all 
       of us over the years. We would naturally hope that the 
       ORRA would not entertain any thoughts whatsoever in 
       being involved and therefore lending credence to[CGI]. 
 
(JA.106). Hodges further noted his belief that politicians 
directly involved with a child labor bill sponsored by 
Senator Harkin, a subject high on ORIA's lobbying agenda, 
would be invited to attend the CGI trade show. Hodges 
expressed fear that "all of our efforts in dealing with the 
Harkin Bill and responsibly trying to address child labor 
could be undone by any `loose cannons' developing their 
own game plan." He concluded with the request that 
"through your leadership, . . . the ORRA take a long and 
very close look at the negative ramifications in lending your 
name to this very damaging endeavor." Apparently after 
interim contact with ORRA, Hodges again wrote ORRA's 
president on March 28, 1995, expressing his sentiments 
"that Emmert Elsea's attitudes toward wholesalers[are] . . . 
both incorrect and unhealthy," and of his concern with 
Elsea's approach toward eradicating child labor. 
 
Significantly, the minutes of an April 1994 ORIA 
membership meeting show that "Dan and Gene," 
presumably a reference to Dan Hodges and Eugene 
Newman, had contacted the ORRA and obtained its promise 
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not to endorse the August trade show as a group. The 
minutes also reflect that "Gene" "urged the [ORIA] members 
who import from Pakistan, India and other countries to 
write the proper Export Promotion authorities in those 
countries and advise them not to participate in this show." 
The minutes of an August 1994 ORIA meeting reflect that 
this statement was amended to read "Gene Newman 
suggested that the individual members and not the 
organization" engage in this letter writing campaign. 
 
In addition, the plaintiffs also offered one piece of 
documentary evidence intended to show that the 
defendants were boycotting domestic retailers and foreign 
manufacturers who supported the trade shows. These were 
handwritten notes dated May 25, 1994, taken by an 
unidentified rug retailer in Virginia, of a telephone 
conversation between the retailer and a representative of 
defendant Kelaty Rugs International. The notes describe the 
importer's representative as "irate," and record the retailers' 
fear that because of his cooperation with Elsea,"we will not 
be able to get rugs from anyone." Most significantly, the 
unidentified retailer stated "We are being dealt with from 
both ends. i.e., cannot get supplied in U.S.[,] also those 
who supply us from overseas will be boycotted by 
importers." The Magistrate Judge did not credit this 
evidence because it was unclear who wrote these notes. 
When the plaintiffs later objected to the Magistrate Judge's 
R&R before the District Court, they offered the declaration 
of someone named William Hirsch, in which Hirsch 
purported to authenticate these notes as his own. Although 
the defendants contend that this declaration was not 
submitted before the magistrate, plaintiffs claim it was 
submitted and the magistrate simply disregarded it. 
(Appellants' Reply Br. at 3-4). 
 
Finally, CGI offered a declaration of Emmert Elsea dated 
July 17, 1997. Elsea made the following pertinent 
representations: 
 
       4. Joseph Zarnigin of Zarnigin Rugs, an ORIA 
       member located in New York, informed me and Anne 
       Williams that he would participate in the 1993 trade 
       show except that doing so would jeopardize his 
       membership in and benefits from ORIA. 
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       5. DCC, Inc., an ORIA member located in New York, 
       said he would purchase space in the 1993 trade show, 
       but later refused to do so because ORIA strongly 
       opposed the trade show. 
 
       6. Rug News[, a trade magazine intended for retail 
       readership,] refused to accept advertising for the 1993 
       trade show. 
 
       7. Decorative Rug[, a similar magazine,] withdrew its 
       acceptance of CGI's advertising on the grounds that it 
       would lose its ORIA customers if it allowed CGI to 
       advertise. The publisher of Decorative Rug also stated 
       that he was being pressured by ORIA to run 
       unfavorable editorials concerning CGI. 
 
       8. Anadol Rugs, an ORIA member located in New 
       York, executed a contract and paid a deposit for space 
       in the 1994 trade show. The contract was not forged. 
       Anadol cancelled [sic] its contract after its anticipated 
       participation was revealed to ORIA, and, according to 
       the president of Anadol, ORIA pressured it. 
 
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the defendants' 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction be 
granted. He concluded that FTAIA governed the Court's 
subject matter jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs failed to 
establish jurisdiction under the Act because they failed to 
prove that the defendants' conduct had a direct and 
substantial effect on United States domestic commerce. 
(R&R 10-11.) 
 
B. Additional Jurisdictional Evidence 
Offered To the District Court. 
 
The plaintiffs subsequently filed objections to the 
Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation with the 
District Court. In so doing, both they and the defendants 
submitted additional evidence to that Court for its 
consideration. For example the plaintiffs offered additional 
evidence intended to show that ORIA and the individual rug 
importers had pressured independent trade publications to 
reject advertising for the trade show. They offered Elsea's 
contemporaneously written notes of a September 1993 
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telephone conversation with Ron O'Callaghan of Decorative 
Rugs magazine, an independent trade publication, in which 
he recorded that O'Callaghan "rejected his acceptance of " 
CGI's advertisements for the 1993 trade show. Elsea 
reported that O'Callaghan stated that if he printed the ads, 
ORIA and other importers would quit advertising, and that 
ORIA opposed the show and had pressured Decorative Rug 
magazine to run editorials against it. In response, the 
defendants offered a certification from O'Callaghan in which 
he denied that he made such statements, and specifically 
stated that none of the importers ever contacted him and 
threatened to quit advertising in his magazine if it accepted 
advertisements from Elsea for his Chicago trade show. 
 
The plaintiffs also offered a letter from an advertising 
consultant reporting that when the consultant tried to 
place an advertisement in Rug News, another independent 
trade publication, she was told by Rug News official Les 
Stroh that the advertisement would not be accepted 
because the trade show would "damage the oriental rug 
importers." (JA.127). In response, the defendants offered 
excerpts from a deposition of Stroh, in which he testified 
that he never received any recommendation from ORIA not 
to accept ads from manufacturers. Stroh also denied ever 
having any conversations with anyone from ORIA 
pertaining to the acceptance or rejection of advertisements 
from manufacturers. (JA. 178-81). 
 
The plaintiffs also offered the minutes of a December 
1993 ORIA executive board meeting, at which the board 
discussed CGI's November 1993 Chicago trade show. The 
minutes report a discussion concerning a memorandum 
that would be sent to all members about the operations of 
CGI, "which held a trade fair in Chicago last November 
where they had cut out the role of the importer in the chain 
of distribution." Lee Harounian, an ORIA board member, 
suggested that ORIA members "boycott" the manufacturers 
participating in the show. The executive board ultimately 
decided that this memorandum should not go to all 
members but to the board members only. 
 
In addition, Elsea submitted a supplemental declaration 
in which he recounted that the owner of Istanbul Grand 
Bazaar ("IGB"), a company that both manufactures rugs in 
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Turkey and imports them into the U.S. (and therefore is a 
member of ORIA), expressed interest in participating in 
CGI's 1994 trade show, but said he would not be the only 
ORIA member to do so. Elsea asserted that he informed 
IGB's owner that another Turkish importer/manufacturer 
and ORIA member, Anadol Rugs, also was participating. 
Subsequently, Elsea claimed, he received a fax from Anadol 
Rugs informing him that Anadol "had received a fax from 
ORIA concerning [its] participation in the trade fair." As a 
consequence, Anadol was "canceling" its participation in 
the trade fair. The fax, also offered as evidence, stated that 
Anadol "ha[s] no intentions whatsoever to attend this 
exhibit[ion]." The fax further admonished CGI to "please 
rectify this matter immediately, writing to [ORIA] that it was 
a mistake on your part." Neither Anadol nor IGB 
participated in the trade show. 
 
The plaintiffs also offered evidence of ORIA's historical 
efforts to prevent foreign manufacturers from selling 
directly to U.S. retailers. In 1992, Pakistani rug 
manufacturers sold some rugs directly to Bloomingdale's 
department store, an American retailer. In September of 
that year, following this sale, then-ORIA president (and 
defendant) Isaac Etessami wrote to the Pakistani Minister 
of Commerce complaining of this practice, with emphasis 
on EPB's subsidization of Bloomingdales' promotion. The 
letter reminded the Pakistani minister of the "traditional, 
established and respected chain of distribution" in the 
United States, to wit, "MANUFACTURER/EXPORTER-- 
IMPORTER/WHOLESALER -- RETAILER -- CONSUMER." 
The letter also admonished Pakistani exporters to 
concentrate their promotion sales efforts on American 
importers "and not attempt to involve themselves with 
retailers, who are the importers' customers." (Emphasis in 
original). The lengthy letter concluded with the exhortation: 
"Work with the American importer in promoting your rugs 
and not around him." 
 
Finally, the plaintiffs offered a memorandum from the 
president of ORRA addressed to the ORRA board, written 
shortly after the president received the March 23, 1994 
letter from then-ORIA president Hodges regarding potential 
ORRA sponsorship of CGI's 1994 trade fair. The memo read 
in part: 
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       Over the past year ORRA has made significant progress 
       in mending fences with its sister organization ORIA. 
       . . . Last year a letter went out under my signature that 
       effectively distanced ORRA from [CGI]. . . . The building 
       process is slow . . . . . and it will come to a grinding 
       halt, in my opinion, if we even entertain the notion of 
       joining forces with [CGI]. 
 
       Both Dan Hodges and Gene Newman have gone on 
       record requesting that ORRA continue to disassociate 
       itself from Mr. Elsea's efforts. 
 
In response, the defendants offered excerpts from the 
deposition of the ORRA president, in which she testified 
that nobody "at ORIA [told her] . . . that moving away from 
an affiliation with another trade fair would improve 
relations." 
 
C. Subsequent Proceedings. 
 
The District Court, "having conducted de novo review of " 
the Magistrate Judge's recommended disposition, the 
parties' subsequent submissions, and the underlying 
record, but not of the additional evidence submitted to the 
District Court after the issuance of the Magistrate Judge's 
initial report and recommendation, remanded the matter to 
the Magistrate Judge, so that the arguments raised in 
plaintiffs' objections could be adequately evaluated. 
 
On remand, the Magistrate Judge considered CGI's 
"additional legal arguments," but did not consider the 
additional evidence submitted to the District Court. After 
consideration of the arguments, the Magistrate Judge 
issued a supplemental report and recommendation 
affirming his original report. The District Court 
subsequently adopted both reports and dismissed the 




Subject matter jurisdiction in this case rests, if at all, on 
28 U.S.C. S 1337(a), which states that "[t]he District Courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or 
proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating 
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commerce or protecting trade and commerce against 
restraints and monopolies." On appeal to this Court, the 
primary question presented is whether the District Court 
possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' 
antitrust claims in light of the FTAIA, which limits the 
applicability of the Sherman Act in certain circumstances. 
In addition to fervently disputing the plaintiffs' arguments, 
the defendants offer two additional arguments as 
alternative bases on which this Court might affirm the 
District Court's dismissal of this action. First, they argue 
even assuming the FTAIA does not apply, the plaintiffs have 
not established subject matter jurisdiction under the 
Sherman Act. Second, they argue that the plaintiffs do not 





We first turn to the relevant provisions of the"inelegantly 
phrased" FTAIA.4 This statute, when parsed, states two 
requirements about when the Sherman Act, which falls 
within the jurisdictional ambit of 28 U.S.C. S 1337, applies. 
First, the initial sentence of Section 6a, along with its 
"import trade or commerce" parenthetical, provides that the 
antitrust law shall apply to conduct "involving" import trade 
or commerce with foreign nations (provided, of course, that 
jurisdiction is found to exist under the Sherman Act itself). 
15 U.S.C. S 6a. Second, Section 6a(1)(A) states that the 
antitrust laws shall not apply to all other conduct involving 
trade or commerce with foreign nations unless such 
conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect on (a) domestic trade or commerce, or (b) 
import trade or commerce with foreign nations. 15 U.S.C. 
S 6a(1)(A). 
 
Here, the defendants attack subject matter jurisdiction 
"in fact," meaning they dispute the existence of certain 
jurisdictional facts alleged by the plaintiffs. When a 
defendant attacks subject matter jurisdiction "in fact," as 
opposed to an attack on the allegations on the face of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st 
Cir. 1997). 
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complaint, the Court is free to weigh the evidence and 
satisfy itself whether it has power to hear the case. 
Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 
891 (3d Cir. 1977). In such a situation, "no presumptive 
truthfulness attaches to plaintiff 's allegations, and the 
existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the 
trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of 
jurisdictional claims." Id. In addition, the burden of proving 
the existence of subject matter jurisdiction lies with the 
plaintiff. Id. The parties appear to agree that under the 
Mortensen framework for analyzing factual challenges to 
subject matter jurisdiction, this Court reviews the District 
Court's and Magistrate Judge's findings of jurisdictional 
facts for clear error. 
 
In their complaint, the plaintiffs in this case allege a 
broad horizontal conspiracy among United States rug 
importer/wholesalers to restrain the domestic rug trade 
between foreign manufacturers and United States domestic 
retailers at plaintiffs' trade shows, and to restrain sales 
between foreign manufacturers and such retailers on 
buying trips abroad. They charge that the defendants' 
conduct restrained United States commerce, alleging 
threats not to purchase rugs from any manufacturer that 
participates in the plaintiffs' trade shows; threats not to 
purchase rugs from any manufacturer that sells rugs to 
any retailer on a buying trip; reducing or ceasing purchases 
of rugs from manufacturers that participate in plaintiffs' 
trade fairs or sell to retailers on buying trips; threats to 
retaliate, including expulsion from the association, against 
any ORIA member that participates in the plaintiffs' trade 
shows; and inducing the Carpet Export Promotion Council 
of India, the Export Promotion Board of Pakistan, and the 
Pakistan Carpet Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
not to subsidize the participation of manufacturers from 
those countries in the plaintiffs' trade shows. 
 
Addressing the impact of the FTAIA to this case, the 
Magistrate Judge first determined that the plaintiffs were 
themselves not importers and, therefore, were not eligible 
for the "import trade" exception. The Magistrate Judge then 
addressed whether the evidence in the record supported a 
finding of subject matter jurisdiction under the statute. 
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The Magistrate Judge apparently found that the evidence 
plaintiffs introduced to back up their allegations was 
credible only with respect to the charge that they 
"attempt[ed] to induce or induc[ed] the Carpet Export 
Promotion Council of India, the Export Promotion Board of 
Pakistan, and the Pakistan Carpet Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association not to subsidize the participation of 
manufacturers from those countries in the plaintiffs' trade 
fairs." The Magistrate Judge held that this did not describe 
conduct having a "direct" and "substantial" effect on import 
trade or commerce.5 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge and, 
subsequently, the District Court, held that this case fell 
under the FTAIA's exemption from the antitrust laws, and 
that subject matter jurisdiction was therefore lacking. 
 
The District Court and Magistrate Judge both ignored 
significant additional evidence offered by the plaintiffs to 
back up their other allegations. Under 28 U.S.C.S 636 and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), where a District 
Court reviews a Magistrate Judge's report and 
recommendation regarding a dispositive motion, the Court 
has discretion whether to consider additional evidence not 
presented to the Magistrate Judge.6 See United States v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The parties did not place in contention the issue of whether the 
challenged conduct had a "reasonably foreseeable" effect on import or 
domestic commerce. See 15 U.S.C. S 6a(1)(A). 
6. Title 28 United States Code, section 636(b) states, in relevant part, 
that after a District Court receives objections to a Magistrate Judge's 
report, the District Court: 
 
       shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report 
       or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 
       objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or 
modify, 
       in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 
       magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit 
       the matter to the magistrate with instructions. 
 
Similarly, Rule 72(b) states, in relevant part, that upon receiving 
written objections to a Magistrate Judge's report, the District Court: 
 
       shall make a de novo determination on the record, or after 
       additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's 
       disposition. . . . The district judge may accept, reject, or modify 
the 
       recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the 
       matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 
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Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1980). Moreover, it has, on 
occasion, been held that it is within the discretion of a 
district court reviewing a Magistrate Judge's report and 
recommendation de novo to ignore newly proffered evidence 
because the evidence is untimely, and the proponent of the 
evidence has provided no reason why he did not present it 
before the Magistrate Judge. See Callas v. Trane CAC, Inc., 
776 F. Supp. 1117, 1119 (W.D. Va. 1990), aff 'd, 940 F.2d 
651 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Freeman v. County of Bexar, 
142 F.3d 848, 852 (5th Cir. 1998) (District Court has 
"obligation to review de novo the actual evidence on 
objected-to findings, but the District Court should not be 
compelled to ignore that the parties had a full and fair 
opportunity to present their best evidence to the magistrate 
judge"). 
 
The District Court's opinion remanding the matter back 
to the Magistrate Judge, however, is troublesome. The 
District Court noted that it had been presented with 
"additional arguments, not additional evidence permissible 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)." It is not clear from this 
statement that the District Court even realized that 
plaintiffs had presented additional evidence. In any event, 
the Court did not exercise its discretion under 18 U.S.C. 
S 636 and Rule 72(b) not to consider that evidence. 
Additional evidence, however, plainly was presented."At 
least, the statute's authority for the court `to receive further 
evidence' in the course of de novo review of a magistrate 
judge's decision requires that discretion must be exercised." 
Freeman, 142 F.3d at 852. We believe that in the context of 
a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction which can be 
raised at any time during the course of the litigation, the 
District Court should have considered the additional 
evidence. The evidence was significant and was before the 
Court when the Magistrate Judge sent up his first report 
and recommendation. Yet without explanation, the District 
Court ignored the additional evidence and remanded the 
matter to the Magistrate Judge to consider only the 
additional arguments of the parties. 
 
The Magistrate Judge held that this case did not fall into 
the FTAIA's parenthetical exclusion, i.e., did not"involve" 
import trade or commerce, because the plaintiffs in this 
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case were not importers, but merely brokers. As plaintiffs 
observe, this is plainly an inaccurate reading of the FTAIA. 
It is an incorrect focus on the plaintiffs' function rather 
than the defendants' conduct. The FTAIA's exemption from 
the Sherman Act focuses on the latter's application to 
"conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import 
trade or import commerce) with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. 
S 6a (emphasis added). The implication that the Sherman 
Act provisions "apply to import trade and import commerce 
is unmistakable." Eskofot A/S v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The proper 
inquiry was therefore whether the alleged conduct by the 
defendants "involved" import trade or commerce, not on 
whether the plaintiff 's conduct, which is not being 
challenged as violative of the Sherman Act, "involved" 
import trade or commerce. 
 
Congress enacted the FTAIA for the purpose of facilitating 
the export of domestic goods by exempting export 
transactions that did not injure the United States economy 
from the Sherman Act and thereby relieving exporters from 
a competitive disadvantage in foreign trade. See  1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2431, 2432; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993). Thus, the Act's 
declaration of purpose states "[i]t is the purpose of this act 
to increase United States exports of products and services 
by," inter alia, "modifying the application of the antitrust 
laws to certain export trade." Pub. L. No. 97-290, 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 1234 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
S 4001(b)). The Act specifically excludes the importation of 
goods and domestic commerce from its antitrust exemption. 
"The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, 
but only when the conduct has an effect on American 
commerce." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.2 (1986). 
 
       Since the FTAIA clearly states that the Sherman Act is 
       not applicable to trade or commerce other than import 
       trade or import commerce, the Sherman Act continues 
       to apply to import trade and import commerce, thereby 
       rendering the FTAIA's requirement of a direct, 
       substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect 
       inapplicable to an action alleging an impact on import 
       trade and import commerce. 
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54 Am. Jur. 2d S 18, at 77 (footnote omitted). Here, the 
plaintiffs' activities involved both buying trips abroad where 
manufacturers sold rugs to American retailers for 
importation into this country, and trade show sales in the 
United States where manufacturers sold rugs to American 
retailers. Therefore, the defendants intended their alleged 
conduct to subvert commercial activities that solely 
impacted domestic commerce. Plaintiffs charge that 
defendants engaged in a course of activity designed to 
ensure that only United States importers, and not United 
States retailers, could bring oriental rugs manufactured 
abroad into the stream of American commerce. 
 
Even if this Court considered only the evidence presented 
before the Magistrate Judge, the latter erred in ruling that 
the defendants' conduct did not "involve import trade or 
commerce." The defendant association identifies itself as an 
organization of "rug importers"; the individual defendants 
are its officers and directors. Admittedly, the FTAIA 
differentiates between conduct that "involves" such 
commerce, and conduct that "directly, substantially, and 
foreseeably" affects such commerce. To give the latter 
provision meaning, the former must be given a relatively 
strict construction. The evidence before the Magistrate 
Judge dealt largely with efforts to prevent Indian and 
Pakistani export boards from giving financial assistance to 
CGI or to manufacturers who wanted to participate in CGI's 
trade shows. It also dealt with efforts to convince ORRA, the 
trade association of United States rug retailers, from 
sponsoring the shows. These are activities that arguably did 
not, standing alone, "involve" import trade or commerce, 
but that did relate directly to them. 
 
Elsea's declaration, however, makes allegations that ORIA 
pressured Zarnigan Rugs, DCC, Inc., and Anadol Rugs, 
Inc., themselves ORIA members who were involved both in 
importing and foreign manufacturing, to refrain from 
participating in CGI's trade shows. This evidence was 
uncontested before the Magistrate Judge. These allegations 
directly involved both import and domestic commerce. 7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Magistrate Judge noted that many of the allegations in Elsea's 
declaration are based only on `information and belief " rather than on 
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Significantly, Mortensen makes clear that because, in the 
Sherman Act context, jurisdictional facts are often closely 
intertwined with the merits of the claim, "it is incumbent 
upon the trial judge to demand less in the way of 
jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial 
stage." 549 F.2d at 892. Under this standard, the 
uncontested evidence in Elsea's declaration alone arguably 
should have been sufficient to remove the FTAIA as an 
obstacle to jurisdiction. Accordingly, the District Court 
committed clear error in ordering a dismissal of the action 
at this stage of the proceedings. 
 
Furthermore, the foregoing conclusion finds even 
stronger support when one considers all of the evidence 
submitted before both the Magistrate Judge and the 
District Court, especially in light of Mortensen 's less 
stringent evidentiary standard. The plaintiffs have offered 
evidence that defendants took steps to: (1) prevent foreign 
manufacturers from selling to United States retailers, (2) 
prevent at least one American retailer from purchasing rugs 
directly from foreign manufacturers, (3) prevent foreign 
governments and trade associations from sponsoring trade 
fairs at which retailers could purchase directly from foreign 
manufacturers, and (4) prevent an American rug retailers' 
trade association from sponsoring the trade fairs. 8 
 
Finally, the evidence offered by plaintiffs (including the 
evidence offered after the Magistrate Judge's initial report 
issued) reveals that the defendants' alleged conduct had its 
intended negative effect on CGI's trade shows and, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
personal knowledge, but did not specify what effect this had on the 
weighing of the allegations. We believe that the lower evidentiary 
standard applied to challenges to summary judgment under Mortensen 
required the Court to credit undisputed evidentiary contentions even 
when based on "information and belief." Moreover, the more relevant 
contentions in Elsea's declaration do appear to have been based on his 
personal contact with entities such as Zarnigan, DDC, and Anadol. 
 
8. The plaintiffs also contend that the defendants tried to dissuade 
independent rug trade publications from accepting advertising for CGI's 
trade fairs. The evidence regarding these efforts is heavily disputed in 
the 
record, however, and therefore we do not conclude that the lower courts' 
rejection of this evidence was clearly erroneous. 
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consequently, had the effect of protecting the defendants' 
import and wholesale business. Accordingly, the evidence, 
taken as a whole, is sufficient to support the plaintiffs' 
allegations that the challenged conduct "involved" import 
trade or commerce. The crux of their case involves conduct 
in the United States, not conduct abroad. We hold that 
these activities are not the type of conduct Congress 
intended to remove from our antitrust jurisdiction when it 
enacted the FTAIA. The FTAIA therefore does did not divest 





The defendants next argue that even assuming the FTAIA 
does not divest the federal courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims, the District Court 
nevertheless lacked jurisdiction under the Sherman Act 
itself. They contend that the plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate that the defendants' alleged conduct had a 
sufficient effect on United States interstate commerce. 
Because the parties did not include the defendants' motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the 
record filed with this Court, it is not clear to us that this 
argument was presented to the District Court or Magistrate 
Judge. However, the defendants argue that the test for 
Sherman Act jurisdiction is identical to the "substantial 
and direct effects" test under the FTAIA, which the District 
Court did consider. For this reason, and because an 
appellate court is always free to review the existence of 
subject matter jurisdiction, we will resolve the procedural 
doubt in favor of the defendants and address this 
argument. 
 
The defendants contend that the plaintiffs must 
demonstrate a "substantial" effect on our domestic 
commerce to support the exercise of jurisdiction under the 
Sherman Act. They place primary reliance for this 
proposition on Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 
764, 796 n.23 (1993). By contrast, the Department of 
Justice, as amicus curiae, focuses on language in other 
cases that all the plaintiffs need show is that the restraint 
either interfered with the sale of rugs in interstate 
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commerce or had a "not insubstantial" effect on interstate 
commerce to invoke Sherman Act jurisdiction. 
 
The plaintiffs pose a different argument in support of 
Sherman Act jurisdiction. They contend that their 
allegations of a horizontal group boycott are subject to a per 
se analysis, rather than analysis under the rule of reason. 
In adjudicating a per se claim on its merits, effects on 
commerce should be presumed and a market power inquiry 
is unnecessary. The plaintiffs extend this reasoning to 
argue that where a per se claim is at issue, this 
presumption of market impact holds equally true for 
purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
Traditionally, horizontal group boycotts are generally 
judged under a per se analysis. See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway- 
Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). The Supreme Court, 
however, has curtailed the application of the per se analysis 
in cases alleging concerted refusals to deal in recent years. 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs claims appear to fall within that 
class of cases that still enjoys per se analysis. They claim 
that the conspiring importer/wholesaler firms (themselves 
competitors, making this a horizontal boycott) engaged in a 
"naked" restraint by agreeing not to deal with 
manufacturers who sold to United States retailers directly, 
or with such retailers who purchased directly from 
manufacturers. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' 
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); H ERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, P 2203 (1999). According to one 
commentator, a truncated antitrust analysis remains 
applicable to "concerted refusals that upon brief inspection 
are unlikely to have any purpose other than the reduction 
of market output and attendant price increases. In that 
case, condemnation is in order without any inquiry into 
[market] power." ANTITRUST L AW P 2203a. 
 
Similarly, this Court has stated, 
 
       per se boycott cases usually contain three elements: 
       "denial of something a competitor needs to compete 
       effectively, defendants with a dominant position in the 
       relevant market, and the absence of any plausible 
       contention that the challenged behavior would 
       `enhance overall efficiency and make markets more 
       competitive.' " 
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Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 463 (3d Cir. 
1998) (quoting P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
P 1510 (Supp.1997) (quoting and interpreting Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing 
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1985))). The defendants' 
conduct complained of fits this description. It can be 
characterized as having a "pernicious effect on competition" 
and lacks any redeeming virtue. See Rossi, 156 F.3d at 461 
(quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958)). 
 
Although "[t]he mere allegation of a concerted refusal to 
deal does not suffice because not all concerted refusals to 
deal are intentionally anticompetitive," id.  at 463 (quoting 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295, 298), it 
appears that the refusal to deal here at issue is 
predominantly anticompetitive. If the plaintiffs can prove at 
trial that the alleged conspiracy actually exists, the 
anticompetitive effect of such a conspiracy would be 
"immediately obvious." FTC v. Indiana Federation of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986). There appears to be no 
reason for the defendants' action other than to protect the 
wholesaler/importer's role in the chain of distribution. 
 
The defendants correctly observe that under Supreme 
Court precedent, "the per se approach has generally been 
limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott 
suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from 
doing business with a competitor." Indiana Federation of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458. Market power is the power to 
control prices and exclude competition. See American 
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 789 (1946). 
However, "when the defendants are not engaged in any 
significant integration of production or distribution, and the 
only rationale for the restraint is the elimination of 
additional, lower-cost, higher quality, or more innovative 
output from the market," this rationale "implies the 
existence of market power." ANTITRUST LAW P 2203a. Plaintiffs 
have not offered specific evidence to show what portion of 
the United States market for the importation and wholesale 
distribution of oriental rugs was affected by defendants' 
actions or the potential market impact of their lost trade 
show sales. The District Court and Magistrate Judge relied 
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heavily on this absence of evidence in dismissing their 
claims. Nevertheless, because the evidence offered by the 
plaintiffs indicates that the defendants' conduct had its 
intended effect of undermining the trade shows, and that 
its only purpose was to eliminate competition in the United 
States, this raises a strong inference that ORIA and its 
member rug importer/wholesalers possessed some degree 
of market power. Accordingly, per se treatment appears 
appropriate here.9 
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court noted the broad reach of 
the Sherman Act and has made clear that a plaintiff 's 
burden of establishing effects on commerce sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is not great. The 
jurisdictional requirement of the Act "may be satisfied 
under either the `in commerce' or the `effect on commerce' 
theory." McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 
233, 242 (1980). McLain controls when subject matter 
jurisdiction over domestic conduct is at issue. We reject the 
defendants' reliance on Hartford Fire, because it dealt 
exclusively with the extraterritorial applicability of the 
Sherman Act to wholly foreign conduct. The instant case 
deals primarily with conduct in the United States, namely 
concerted action by United States importer/wholesalers 
directly to affect the domestic retail oriental rug market. 
Accordingly, . . ." All the plaintiffs need demonstrate is 
"either that the defendants' activity is itself in interstate 
commerce or, if it is local in nature, that it has an effect on 
some other activity demonstrably in interstate commerce." 
Id.; see also Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 896. 
 
No one claims that the conduct here at issue is"local in 
nature," and therefore no "effects" test even comes into 
play. Instead, we focus on whether the plaintiffs' have 
proffered evidence that the defendants' anticompetitive 
activity is itself in interstate commerce. It is clear from the 
uncontradicted evidence presented that requisite nexus to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The District Court held that ORIA was a "professional organization," 
much like the Indiana Federation of Dentists, and for this reason 
plaintiffs' claims were subject to a rule of reason analysis. This 
conclusion was clearly erroneous, and the defendants do not even 
attempt to defend it on appeal. 
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interstate commerce exists here. ORIA is headquartered in 
New Jersey; several of the defendant wholesalers/importers 
are located in New York; the defendants wrote to the Rhode 
Island-based president of ORRA to dissuade that 
organization from co-sponsoring the trade shows; at least 
one retailer who was pressured not to associate with CGI is 
based in Virginia; Elsea and CGI are based in Virginia; and 
the trade shows took place in Chicago, Illinois and 
Washington, DC. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs 
therefore need not quantify the actual effect defendants' 
conduct had on interstate commerce to support federal 
jurisdiction. See McLain, 444 U.S. at 243; Fuentes v. South 
Hill Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1991); see 
also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 331 
(1991). 
 
Thus, because the plaintiffs have introduced evidence 
sufficient to show that the challenged conduct actually 
occurred in interstate commerce, we conclude that subject 





Finally, the defendants contend that even if subject 
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims exists, this 
Court should nevertheless affirm the dismissal of those 
claims because the plaintiffs lack antitrust standing to 
bring an action under the Sherman Act. Specifically, they 
contend that antitrust standing is lacking because the 
plaintiffs are merely brokers, and are not themselves the 
defendants' competitors or consumers in the relevant  
market.10 Their argument relies on a recent decision of this 
Court in Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 118 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Stated briefly, SmithKline Beecham ("SB") manufactured 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The defendants first raised this argument before the District Court in 
their memorandum opposing the plaintiffs' objection to the magistrate's 
initial report. However, the Magistrate Judge did not rely on this 
argument on remand, and the District Court did not rely on it in 
adopting the Magistrate Judge's reports. 
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a hepatitis-B vaccine. Traditionally, it had sold the vaccine 
to pharmacists, who in turn sold the vaccine to nursing 
homes. SB, however, entered into a contract with Barton & 
Pittinos ("B&P") under which B&P distributed marketing 
materials about the vaccine to and solicited orders from 
nursing homes. B&P would then pass the orders to a third 
company, General Injectables and Vaccines, Inc. ("GIV"), 
which would purchase the vaccine from SB, resell it to the 
nursing homes, thus fulfilling the orders. The pharmacists 
became upset that SB had chosen another manner of 
vaccine distribution, and complained to SB. As a result, SB 
terminated its arrangement with B&P and GIV. B&P sued 
SB for conspiring with the pharmacists to restrain 
competition in the nursing home market for vaccine. 
 
The Court dismissed the case, holding that B&P lacked 
antitrust standing to sue under the Sherman Act because 
its injury was not of a type the antitrust laws were designed 
to prevent.11 The parties apparently agreed, and the Court 
acknowledged, that to have antitrust standing, B&P must 
have been either a consumer or a competitor in the relevant 
market. The Court focused its inquiry on whether B&P was 
a "competitor." It held that, although the SB/B&P/GIV 
arrangement, taken as a whole, competed directly with the 
pharmacists, B&P was not by itself in competition with 
them because B&P lacked the license required to resell the 
vaccine which GIV had provided. See id. 182-83. 
"Consequently, there was no cross-elasticity of demand 
between the pharmacists' offering and B&P's offerings; no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Court noted that the existence of "antitrust injury" was one of 
several factors that go into a determination regarding antitrust standing. 
The other factors are: 
 
       the causal connection between the antitrust violation and the harm 
       to the plaintiff and the intent by the defendant to cause that 
harm, 
       with neither factor alone conferring standing; . . . the directness 
of 
       the injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal application 
of 
       standing principles might produce speculative claims; . . . the 
       existence of more direct victims of the alleged antitrust 
violations; 
       and . . . the potential for duplicative recovery or complex 
       apportionment of damages. 
 
Id. at 181. 
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matter how much the pharmacists raised the price of the 
package of the goods and services that they offered, the 
nursing homes could not have switched to B&P." Id. at 183. 
Thus, the Court concluded, "advertisers and brokers of a 
good or service are not competitors of companies that 
actually supplied the good or service." Id.  at 184. 
 
The defendants claim that the plaintiffs' trade shows are 
no different from B&P's role as a marketer and solicitor of 
orders. We disagree. First, as the plaintiffs explain quite 
thoroughly in their reply brief to this Court, Barton & 
Pittinos arguably rests on an overstated premise. The 
Court's conclusion in Barton that in order to suffer 
antitrust injury, one must be either in competition with the 
defendant or a consumer of its goods or services, if 
construed as an absolute (which arguably it need not be), 
may in some circumstances lead to results that conflict 
with Supreme Court and other precedent.12  Indeed, this 
Court recently acknowledged that although generally only 
competitors and consumers will suffer antitrust injury (an 
essential component of antitrust standing), such injury may 
in some circumstances inhere where the harm is 
" `inextricably intertwined' with the defendant's 
wrongdoing." Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund 
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 926 & n.8 (3d Cir. 
1999) (quoting Gulfstream III Assoc., Inc. v. Gulfstream 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California 
State 
Council of Carpenters, the Court articulatedfive factors that courts 
should consider in analyzing the existence of antitrust standing. 459 
U.S. 519, 545 (1983). This Court has summarized them as follows: 
 
       (1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and the 
       harm to the plaintiff and the intent by the defendant to cause 
harm, 
       with neither factor alone conferring standing; (2) whether the 
       plaintiff 's alleged injury is of the type for which the antitrust 
laws 
       were intended to provide redress; (3) the directness of the injury, 
       which addresses the concerns that liberal application of standing 
       principles might produce speculative claims; (4) the existence of 
       more direct victims of the alleged antitrust violations; and (5) 
the 
       potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of 
       damages. 
 
In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1163 n.9 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
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Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 429 (3d Cir. 1993)), cert. 
denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000). 
 
Regardless, even assuming that the plaintiffs in this case 
could have standing only if they compete with the 
defendants, Barton & Pittinos is distinguishable. Their trade 
shows and buying trips can most certainly be categorized 
as in competition with the rug importer/wholesalers. Elsea 
and CGI, by themselves, offered an alternative avenue of 
distribution to that offered by the wholesaler/importers. If 
the wholesaler/importers raised the prices at which they 
sold oriental rugs to domestic retailers, those retailers 
could go to CGI's trade shows and purchase rugs there 
directly from manufacturers. In other words, there is a 
cross-elasticity of demand13 between the plaintiffs' offering 
and the defendants' offering. The plaintiffs' trade shows 
offered retailers (and manufacturers) certain organizational 
efficiencies that previously could be provided only by 
distributing rugs through wholesaler/importers. They 
allowed the rugs to be brought across the ocean and made 
available to retailers. In so doing, the plaintiffs relieved 
retailers of the burdensome task of locating and contacting 
manufacturers abroad, dealing with a web of import and 
customs regulations, and surmounting potential cultural 
obstacles to doing business with Indian, Pakistani, Turkish, 
and possibly other foreign rug manufacturers. 
 
Indeed, as the plaintiffs explain, the instant case bears a 
striking similarity to the facts in Crimpers Promotions Inc. v. 
Home Box Office, 724 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1252 (1994). In Crimpers, the plaintiff organized a 
trade show at which television programming producers 
could sell programs directly to television stations, instead of 
having to sell through distributors first. The plaintiff 
charged that then distributors conspired to sabotage the 
trade show by boycotting potential participants. The Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion written by 
Judge Friendly, held that the plaintiff-trade show organizer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Cross-elasticity of demand is defined as a relationship between two 
products, usually "substitutes for each other, in which a price change for 
one product affects the price of the other." Black's Law Dictionary, 7th 
ed. 
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had standing to bring a Sherman Act claim against the 
distributors. Judge Friendly held that organizer's injury 
was sufficiently direct to confer standing because"[i]t was 
endeavoring to forge a link in a chain of the sale of 
programming, to wit, direct contact between program 
producers and cable television stations, that would compete 
with defendants in their role as middlemen." Id. at 294. 
 
We find Crimpers persuasive. Instead of facilitating the 
sale of television programming between producers and 
television stations, Elsea and CGI "endeavor[ed] to forge a 
link in a chain of the sale" of oriental rugs between foreign 
rug manufacturers and domestic rug retailers. That link 
competed directly with the traditional middlemen-- the rug 
importer/wholesalers. Moreover, the alleged injury to the 
plaintiffs was not merely an indirect or remote consequence 
of the defendants' actions, as might have been the case if 
the defendants' actions had put a rug manufacturer out of 
business, and someone who supplied materials to that 
manufacturer sued under the antitrust laws. See id. 
Rather, "injury to [the plaintiffs] was the precisely intended 
consequence of defendants' boycott," id., and is 
" `inextricably intertwined' with the defendant's 
wrongdoing," Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 926 & n.8. 
 
In addition, the defendants' contention that they did not 
compete with Elsea and CGI is belied by their action to, at 
the very least, dissuade foreign and domestic entities from 
contributing financial support to the plaintiffs' trade shows. 
There is no logical explanation for the defendants' 
assiduous and persistent effort to preserve their role in the 
chain of distribution other than their belief that they were 
threatened by the plaintiffs' activities. Accordingly, we reject 





In summary, we conclude that the FTAIA is inapplicable 
and that the District Court erred in dismissing this case. 
Further, the plaintiffs have offered sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the activities of the wholesale importers 
were intended to and adversely did impact on domestic 
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commerce by engaging in a course of anticompetitive 
conduct to ensure that only they, the importers, could 
bring oriental rugs manufactured abroad into the United 
States for distribution. We further hold that subject matter 
jurisdiction exists under the Sherman Act, and that the 
plaintiffs have antitrust standing. The order of dismissal of 
the District Court will be reversed and the case remanded 
to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. Costs will be taxed against the appellee. 
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